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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH : 
Plaintiff/Appellee : Case No. 970229-CA 
vs. : 




THE STATE CONCEDED THAT DEPUTY SHIVERDECKER CONDUCTED AN 
UNLAWFUL TERRY FRISK OF DEFENDANT IN VIOLATION OF THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
The only argument in Appellee's brief responding to 
Appellant's contention that the Terry frisk was not supported by 
reasonable suspicion is a footnote. Appellee's Br. at 3, n.l. The 
State argues that the issue of the unlawful Terry search of 
Appellant's person is not properly preserved for appeal. Id. 
However, implicit in Defendant's preservation of the illegal 
actions of the Utah County Sheriff's Office at the roadblock in 
question is the preservation of the issue relating to the unlawful 
search of Appellant at the roadblock. (R. 41-82, 113, 118-119). 
The State did not factually dispute the unlawful Terry search of 
Appellant, and thereby, conceded to Appellant's arguments on this 
point. Therefore, this Court should reverse the trial court's 
denial of Appellant's motion to suppress on the basis that 
regardless of whether she was legally stopped, Deputy Shiverdecker 
did not have reasonable suspicion that Appellant posed a danger to 
1 
officer safety which would justify a Terry frisk, ana that the 
scope of Deputy Shiverdecker's search of Appellant exceeded the 
scope of a Terry frisk. See Appellantfs Br. at 41-45 (citing: Terry 
v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1 (1968); State V. RQChell, 850 P.2d 480 (Utah 
App. 1993) :State v. Carter, 812 P.2d 460 (Utah 1991); State V, 
Deitman, 739 P.2d 616 (Utah 1987)). 
POINT II 
THIS COURT SHOULD CONSIDER APPELLANT'S CHALLENGES TO THE 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE CHECKPOINT STATUTE. 
Additionally, the State argues in its brief that this Court 
should not address Appellant's challenges to the constitutionality 
of the Administrative Traffic Checkpoint Act (Utah Code Annotated 
§§ 77-23-101 thru 77-23-105 (1953 as amended)), hereinafter ATCA. 
Appellee's Br. at 11-12. However, if this Court were to accept the 
State's assertion, the constitutionality of ATCA would perhaps 
forever evade constitutional challenge. The State argues: "On 
appeal, the State does challenge the court's ruling on the plan's 
unconstitutional noncompliance with the statute. The issue of good 
faith is independent of the statute's constitutionality and 
determines the outcome of the case." Appellee's Br. at 12 (emphasis 
added). Thus, pursuant to the State's argument, the 
constitutionality of ATCA will essentially never be ripe for 
review, because the issue will always be able to be decided on a 
good faith analysis. Appellant asserts that the constitutional 
issue in the case at bar is similar to the circumstance where 
appellate courts address issues which are technically moot, but the 
issue will likely recur, and is capable of evading review. Wickham 
v. Fisher/ 629 P.2d 896 (Utah 1981); £££ alSQ Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S. 
2 
113 (1973). Therefore, Appellant requests this Court to review the 
constitionality of ATCA under the Fourth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution and Article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution^ 
Additionally, because at the present time, neither the Utah 
Supreme Court nor the Utah Legislature has adopted the good faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule, this Court must at least review 
the constitutionality of ATCA under Article I, § 14 of the Utah 
Constitution. Where the good faith exception to the warrant 
requirement does not presently exist under Article I, § 14, the 
only means of resolution of the issues before this Court require a 
constitutional analysis of ATCA pursuant to Article I, § 14 of the 
Utah Constitution. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT THE LEON GOOD 
FAITH EXCEPTION APPLIED TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE PRESENT 
CASE. 
In Appellee's brief, the State ultimately conceded that the 
Leon rUnited States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984)] good faith 
exception does not apply to the present case: "While Leon expressly 
limited that decision to the good faith execution of judicially 
authorized searches only, its rationale has been more fully 
developed in Illinois v. Krull [Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 
(1987)]." Appellee's Br. at 15. In the present case, it is 
undisputed that the officers did not stop and search defendant 
pursuant to a warrant supported by judicial determination of 
probable cause. Thus, the only possible argument that the good 
faith exception applied to the facts of the present case, is 
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according to the expanded good faith exception pursuant to the 
holding in Krull, 480 U.S. 340. 
However, upon careful review, this court should determine that 
even the expanded good faith exception in Krull does not salvage 
the conduct of law enforcement personnel in the present case. The 
holding in Krull addressed the following issue: 
[W]hether a similar exception [to the Leon exception] to 
the exclusionary rule should be recognized when officers 
act in objectively reasonable reliance upon a statute 
authorizing warrantless administrative searches, but 
where the statute is ultimately found to violate the 
Fourth Amendment." 
ftOlll, 480 U.S. at 342. The majority of the Court in Krull 
ultimately held that although the statute in question was held to 
be unconstitutional, the officer "relied, in objective good faith, 
on a statute that appeared legitimately to allow a warrantless 
administrative search of respondents' business." Id. at 360. The 
present case is distinguishable from Krull in at least two 
significant points: (1) in the present case, the trial court found 
that the officers did not follow the requirements of the statute in 
question providing for administrative traffic checkpoints; (R. at 
106, 107) and (2) the statute at issue, ATCA, has not yet been 
found to be unconstitutional. In order for the extended good faith 
exception as created by Krull to apply, officers must follow the 
requirements of the statute on which they purport to justify their 
actions. Krull. 480 U.S. at 349. Furthermore, the statute must 
subsequently be deemed unconstitutional, or the necessity for an 
expanded good faith exception would never arise. Id. at 360. 
Therefore, as the State conceded, the good faith exception as 
created in Lssn, 468 U.S. 897 does not apply to the facts of the 
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present case, and as discussed above, the expanded good faith 
exception pursuant to Krull, 480 U.S. 340 is also inapplicable. 
The trial court's holding that the good faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule pursuant to the Fourth Amendment applies to the 
facts of the present case was not correct, and this court should 
reverse the trial court's ruling and remand this matter for further 
proceedings. 
Furthermore, as the State conceded in its brief, the court in 
Krull "noted that the good faith exception might not apply if an 
officer erroneously, although in good faith, acted outside the 
scope of a statute." Appellee's Br. at 18 (citing: Krull, 480 U.S. 
at 360 n.17). Thus, even if the Court were to agree with the State 
that the Krull good faith exception applies to the facts of the I 
present case, the fact that the trial court held that the officer's 
actions, even if they were in good faith, were outside the scope of 
the statute. (R. 106, 107). In other words, even if the Utah 
County Sheriff's Officers acted in good faith reliance on the 
magistrate's approval of their roadblock plan, the trial court 
still determined that their actions were not in conformity with 
ATCA (R. 106, 107), and therefore, the good faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule does not apply. 
POINT XV 
THE UTAH COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE AND THE UTAH COUNTY 
ATTORNEY'S OFFICE DID NOT ACT IN GOOD FAITH 
The State would have this Court find that substantial good 
faith is enough good faith for the good faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule to apply. (Appellee's Br. at 19-29). However, 
circumstances which "almost" satisfy an exception to the warrant 
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requirement is wholly inadequate to overcome the per se 
unreasonableness of warrantless searches. State v. Wells, 928 P. 2d 
386 (Utah App. 1996); State v. Brown. 853 P.2d 851 (Utah 1992); and 
Katz v. United States. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Exceptions to the 
warrant requirement are narrowly drawn. See Terry v. Ohio. 3 92 U.S. 
1 (1968); State v. Roybal. 716 P.2d 291 (Utah 1986). The United 
States Supreme Court stated, "[t]he exceptions to the rule that a 
search must rest upon a search warrant have been jealously and 
carefully drawn." Jones v. United States. 357 U.S. 493 (1958). 
In State in Interest of A.R.. 937 P.2d 1037 (Utah App. 1997), 
this Court stated that the good faith exception is one of the 
limited exceptions to the warrant requirement. Id. at 1044 n.7. 
The State's assertion that substantial good faith is sufficient to 
qualify as an exception to the warrant requirement and the 
application of the exclusionary rule is completely contrary to the 
narrowly, carefully, and jealously carved exceptions to the 
requirement that officers obtain a warrant prior to stopping and 
seizing people in our country. 
Furthermore, the mere substantial compliance with the 
requirements of ATCA was due to the choice of the Utah County 
Sheriff's Office and the Utah County Attorney's Office. The 
original roadblock plan submitted to the magistrate by the Utah 
County Attorney's Office and the Utah County Sheriff's Office only 
partially complied with the requirements of ATCA. (SR. 1-39) . 
However, even the degree of partial compliance with ATCA decreased 
over the period of years in which the original plan was amended 
numerous times until the amendment which was in effect at the time 
Appellant was stopped at the roadblock. (SR. 53-79). The fact that 
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the Utah County Sheriff's Office and Utah County Attorney's Office 
were able to get magistrates to rubber-stamp the original roadblock 
plan together with numerous amendments which only partially | 
complied with ATCA does not justify application of the good fait^ 
exception, he&n, 468 U.S. 919 n.20; £EILLL, 480 U.S. at 355. 
Where the Utah County Sheriff's Office and Utah County 
Attorney's Office invited the magistrates to erroneously rubber-
stamp roadblock plans which only partially complied with ATCA, they 
cannot now claim that they acted in good faith because the | 
magistrate accepted their invitation to approve a plan based only 
on partial compliance. It is incongruent and inherent bad faith on 
the part of the Utah County Attorney's Office and Utah County | 
Sheriff's Office to invite error on the part of a magistrate, and 
subsequently, claim that they reasonably relied on the magistrate's 
finding that the roadblock plan was sufficient under ATCA even | 
though it only partially complied with ATCA's requirements. This 
Court should not permit the State to rely on invited error. State 
v, Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688, 700 (Utah App. 1995); State v. EmmettJ 
839 P.2d 781, 788 (Utah 1992); State v. Barella. 714 P.2d 287, 2$8 
(Utah 1986). 
Even if the State's compliance with ATCA rises to the level of 
substantial rather than simply partial compliance, it is not 
sufficient to justify the finding that the good faith exception to 
the warrant requirement is applicable, and this Court should 
reverse the trial court's finding of good faith. 
Additionally, the trial court specifically found that the 
actions of the Utah County Sheriff personnel operating the 
roadblock in question exceeded the scope of permissible roadblocks 
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as articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Michigan v. Sitz.496 
U.S. 444 (1990). (R. 106-107). Thus, under the objective 
reasonable officer standard of good faith, the officers in the 
present case either knew or should have known that the roadblock 
which they were conducting far exceeded the brief detention and 
inquiry to look for signs of impairment authorized in fijjfci. Id. at 
447-55. This Court should not find that the Utah County Sheriff's 
Office acted in good faith in conducting the roadblock in question. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT FIND THAT DEFENDANT FAILED TO 
ARTICULATE A POLICY-BASED REASON TO CONSIDER AN INDEPENDENT 
ANALYSIS UNDER THE STATE CONSTITUTION AND TO THEREBY REJECT 
THE GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION• 
The State argues in its brief that because the trial court did 
not address the state constitutional arguments made by Appellant, 
"the trial court implicitly concluded that defendant failed to 
articulate a policy-based reason to depart from federal law, and, 
thus, properly refused to construe a good faith exception to the 
state exclusionary rule different from the federal good faith 
exception." Appellee's Br. at 30. The State's argument is wild 
speculation. If any conclusion were to be drawn by the trial 
court's silence on Appellant's arguments relative to a separate 
analysis pursuant to Article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution from 
the analysis pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, such a conclusion 
would be that the trial court considered the independent State 
constitutional analysis and determined that although the analysis 
is separate and distinct, the result is the same. Appellant 
maintains that the arguments made before the trial court and in 
Appellant's Brief asserting a separate and distinct analysis of the 
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roadblock issues pursuant to Article I, § 14 of the Utah 
Constitution should be reviewed by this Court for correctness. 
State v. Deli, 861 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993). If this Court is 
reluctant to review Appellant's arguments pursuant to Article I, § 
14, then Appellant would request that this issue be remanded to the 
trial court for further findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
I PQINT VI 
BECAUSE UTAH APPELLATE COURTS HAVE NEVER RECOGNIZED A GOOD 
FAITH EXCEPTION TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 
I, § 14 OP THE UTAH CONSTITUTION, THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING 
SHOULD BE REVERSED. 
The Utah Supreme Court has never recognized a good faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule pursuant to Article I, § 14 of 
the Utah Constitution. State v. Rowef 806 P.2d 730 (Utah App. 
1991), rev'd in part. 850 P.2d 427 (Utah 1992); State v. Larocco. 
294 P.2d 460, 473(Utah 1990); State v. Mendoza. 748 P.2d 181, 187 
(Utah 1987) (Zimmerman, J., concurring). The State cites cases 
such as State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446 (Utah 1995) in an attempt to 
argue that Utah appellate courts have adopted the good faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule. However, Chapman, and all 
other cases in Utah which have affirmatively applied a good faith 
analysis, have done so pursuant to a Fourth Amendment analysis. 
Appellant is unaware of any case in Utah which has addressed the 
good faith exception pursuant to Article I, §14 of the Utah 
Constitution. Therefore, at the present time, there is no good 
faith exception to exclusion of evidence when a police officer's 
violates a person's rights under Article I, §14. 
The State argues in its brief, "Indeed, this Court, as an 
intermediate court of appeals, is not even the proper forum to 
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decide whether Utah lacks a good faith exception comparable to the 
federal exception. . . . " Appellee's Br. at 34. Because there 
presently does not exist a good faith exception under Article I, 
§14 of the Utah Constitution, and the State concedes that this 
Court is not the proper forum to create such an exception, then the 
trial court is certainly not the forum to create a good faith 
exception under Article I, §14. Therefore, the trial court erred 
in not granting Appellant's motion to suppress based on the fact 
that the trial court clearly found that the officer's actions in 
the present case were unconstitutional (R. 6-7), and absent a good 
faith exception pursuant to Article I, §14 exclusion of the 
evidence is the only proper remedy. State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415 
(Utah 1991). 
POINT VII 
A GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE SHOULD NOT BE 
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO ARTICLE I, §14 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
In State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229 (Utah 1996), the Utah 
Supreme Court stated, ". . .Utah courts should construe article I, 
§14 in a manner similar to constructions of the Fourth Amendment 
except in compelling circumstances." Id. at 1235. According to the 
arguments in Appellant's Brief, Appellant asserts that both the 
good faith exceptions pursuant to Leon, 468 U.S. 897 and Krull, 480 
U.S. 340 present the type of compelling circumstances which justify 
Utah Courts in diverging from Fourth Amendment analysis and 
resorting to the State Constitution as approximately 14 other 
states have done in striking down the good faith exception under 
its respective state constitution. 
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Additionally, at least one State, Illinois, while accepting 
the good faith exception pursuant to Lean, 468 U.S. 897, declined 
to accept the expanded good faith exception pursuant to KEILLI, 480 
U.S. 340 (more state's are almost certain to follow): 
We are not willing to recognize an exception to our state 
exclusionary rule that will provide a grace period for 
unconstitutional search and seizure legislation, during 
which time our citizens' prized constitutional rights can 
be violated with impunity. We are particularly disturbed 
by the fact that such a grace period could last for 
several years and affect large numbers of people. This 
is simply too high a price for our citizens to pay. We 
therefore conclude that article I, section 6, of the 
Illinois Constitution of 1970 prohibits the application 
of Krull's extended good-faith exception to our state 
exclusionary rule. 
[W]e note that our decision today does not impact the 
Leon good-faith exception. . . .[0]ne can fully accept 
the rationale and result in Leon while rejecting the 
rationale and result in Krull. This is precisely what 
Justice O'Connor did in her dissent in Krull. 
People v. Krueaer, 675 N.E.2d 604 (111. 1996). 
Due to the compelling circumstances relative to the good faith 
exception and the confusion that is created when reviewing courts 
are forced to "entertain the mind-boggling concept of objectively 
reasonable reliance upon an objectively unreasonable warrant," 
Leon, 468 U.S. at 959 (Brennan J., dissenting) Utah Appellate 
courts should decline to adopt the good faith exceptions created in 
Leon, 468 U.S. 897 and Krull. 480 U.S. 340. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For all of the reasons set forth in Appellant's Brief and 
Appellant's Reply Brief, this court should reverse the trial 
court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress and remand this 
case to the Fourth District Court with directions to suppress the 
evidence and dismiss the charge. 
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Respectfully submitted t h i s 20th day of January, 1998 
landall K. Spenper 
Attorney for Deherrera 
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Assistant Attorney General, Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 
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